Understanding The Investigative Process
!!! WARNING !!!
There is a great deal of reading on this page and all of it will be helpful to you.
Remember, you can't play the game unless you know the rules. And this page is full of the rules!
There is a great deal of reading on this page and all of it will be helpful to you.
Remember, you can't play the game unless you know the rules. And this page is full of the rules!
There are 3 stages in the process:
- The Investigation Phase, while data is being "collected" about you.
- It takes 1 to 12 months, depending on 30 different variables. Location governs most of those variables. Most of that time, your file is in a drawer waiting for an available investigator. Once it gets assigned to someone, expect to be called within 24 hrs.
- Other factors: How many ZIP codes are involved in your life? Residences, jobs, schools, etc.
- How many BI contractors are in each ZIP Code? How competent are they?
- How many OTHER cases pending in each ZIP code?
- How cooperative are each of YOUR contacts?
- It takes 1 to 12 months, depending on 30 different variables. Location governs most of those variables. Most of that time, your file is in a drawer waiting for an available investigator. Once it gets assigned to someone, expect to be called within 24 hrs.
- The report writing Stage:
- Again, this takes 1 to 6 months, depending on the complexity of your life, and the quality of writing skills (and competence) in the people involved. Some cases go through 4 to 8 re-writes, as the report is edited, proofread, re-written, & repeated.
- Sometimes, this is where you will get calls from "DHS" or DC for clarification of your record. The call is from the contractor (USIS, KeyPoint, OMNISEC, etc) but they will not usually give the company name since the average applicant has never heard of their company.
- Again, this takes 1 to 6 months, depending on the complexity of your life, and the quality of writing skills (and competence) in the people involved. Some cases go through 4 to 8 re-writes, as the report is edited, proofread, re-written, & repeated.
- The Adjudication process:
- It could be done in 3 days, or it could take 12 months. Depends on the backlog of case reports that came in BEFORE your file did (even if they were initiated 12 months after you applied) and the competency and efficiency of the adjudicator who draws your case.
- In some cases, the adjudicator finds problems or discrepancies in the report, and it goes BACK to either Phase 2 or Phase 1. More often than in the past, many adjudicators will call the SUBJECT (you) directly for these clarifications. But if they call & miss you twice: they are likely to kick the file back, and go handle twenty other cases while your report gets revised or re-written.
- It could be done in 3 days, or it could take 12 months. Depends on the backlog of case reports that came in BEFORE your file did (even if they were initiated 12 months after you applied) and the competency and efficiency of the adjudicator who draws your case.
The Investigative Process
Background investigations for national security positions are conducted to gather information to determine whether you are reliable, trustworthy, of good conduct and character, and loyal to the U.S. The information that you provide on this form may be confirmed during the investigation. The investigation may extend beyond the time covered by this form, when necessary to resolve issues. Your current employer may be contacted as part
of the investigation, although you may have previously indicated on applications or other forms that you do not want your current employer to be contacted. If you have a security freeze on your consumer or credit report file, then we may not be able to complete your investigation, which can adversely affect your eligibility for a national security position. To avoid such delays, you should request that the consumer reporting agencies lift the freeze in these instances.
In addition to the questions on this form, inquiry also is made about your adherence to security requirements, your honesty and integrity, vulnerability to exploitation or coercion, falsification, misrepresentation, and any other behavior, activities, or associations that tend to demonstrate a person is not reliable, trustworthy, or loyal. Federal agency records checks may be conducted on your spouse or legally recognized civil union/domestic partner, cohabitant(s), and immediate family members. After an eligibility determination has been completed, you also may be subject to continuous evaluation, which may include periodic reinvestigations, to determine whether retention in your position is clearly consistent with the interests of national security.
The information you provide on this form may be confirmed during the investigation, and may be used for identification purposes throughout the investigation process. Your Personal Interview
You investigation will include an interview with you as a routine part of the investigative process. The investigator may ask you to explain your answers to any question on this form. This provides you the opportunity to update, clarify, and explain information on your form more completely, which often assists in completing your investigation. It is imperative that the interview be conducted as soon as possible after you are contacted. Postponements will delay the processing of your investigation, and declining to be interviewed may result in your investigation being delayed or canceled.
For the interview, you will be required to provide photo identification, such as a valid state driver's license. You may be required to provide other documents to verify your identity, as instructed by your investigator. These documents may include certification of any legal name change, Social Security card, passport, and/or your birth certificate. You may also be asked to provide documents regarding information that you provide on this form, or about other matters requiring specific attention. These matters include (a) alien registration or naturalization documentation; (b) delinquent loans or taxes, bankruptcies, judgments, liens, or other financial obligations; (c) agreements involving child custody or support, alimony, or property settlements; (d) arrests, convictions, probation, and/or parole; or (e) other matters described in court records.
Instructions for Completing this Form
Background investigations for national security positions are conducted to gather information to determine whether you are reliable, trustworthy, of good conduct and character, and loyal to the U.S. The information that you provide on this form may be confirmed during the investigation. The investigation may extend beyond the time covered by this form, when necessary to resolve issues. Your current employer may be contacted as part
of the investigation, although you may have previously indicated on applications or other forms that you do not want your current employer to be contacted. If you have a security freeze on your consumer or credit report file, then we may not be able to complete your investigation, which can adversely affect your eligibility for a national security position. To avoid such delays, you should request that the consumer reporting agencies lift the freeze in these instances.
In addition to the questions on this form, inquiry also is made about your adherence to security requirements, your honesty and integrity, vulnerability to exploitation or coercion, falsification, misrepresentation, and any other behavior, activities, or associations that tend to demonstrate a person is not reliable, trustworthy, or loyal. Federal agency records checks may be conducted on your spouse or legally recognized civil union/domestic partner, cohabitant(s), and immediate family members. After an eligibility determination has been completed, you also may be subject to continuous evaluation, which may include periodic reinvestigations, to determine whether retention in your position is clearly consistent with the interests of national security.
The information you provide on this form may be confirmed during the investigation, and may be used for identification purposes throughout the investigation process. Your Personal Interview
You investigation will include an interview with you as a routine part of the investigative process. The investigator may ask you to explain your answers to any question on this form. This provides you the opportunity to update, clarify, and explain information on your form more completely, which often assists in completing your investigation. It is imperative that the interview be conducted as soon as possible after you are contacted. Postponements will delay the processing of your investigation, and declining to be interviewed may result in your investigation being delayed or canceled.
For the interview, you will be required to provide photo identification, such as a valid state driver's license. You may be required to provide other documents to verify your identity, as instructed by your investigator. These documents may include certification of any legal name change, Social Security card, passport, and/or your birth certificate. You may also be asked to provide documents regarding information that you provide on this form, or about other matters requiring specific attention. These matters include (a) alien registration or naturalization documentation; (b) delinquent loans or taxes, bankruptcies, judgments, liens, or other financial obligations; (c) agreements involving child custody or support, alimony, or property settlements; (d) arrests, convictions, probation, and/or parole; or (e) other matters described in court records.
Instructions for Completing this Form
- Follow the instructions provided to you by the office that gave you this form and any other clarifying instructions, provided by that office, to assist you with completion of this form. You must sign and date, in ink, the original and each copy you submit. You should retain a copy of the completed form for your records.
- All questions on this form must be answered. If no response is necessary or applicable, indicate this on the form by checking the associated "Not Applicable" box, unless otherwise noted.
- Do not abbreviate the names of cities or foreign countries. Whenever you are asked to supply a country name, you may select the country name by using the country dropdown feature.
- When entering a U.S. address or location, select the state or territory from the "States" dropdown list that will be provided. For locations outside of the U.S. and its territories, select the country in the "Country" dropdown list and leave the "State" field blank.
- The 5-digit postal Zip Codes are required to process your investigation more rapidly. Refer to an automated system approved by the U.S. Postal Service to assist you with Zip Codes.
- For telephone numbers in the U.S., ensure that the area code is included.
- All dates provided in this form must be in Month/Day/Year or Month/Year format. Use the dropdown lists to select the month and day. The year should be entered as a four character number ( i.e., 1978 or 2001.), or selected from a dropdown list. If you are unable to report an exact date, approximate or estimate the date to the best of your ability, and indicate this by checking the "Est." box.
Final Determination on Your Eligibility
Final determination on your eligibility for a national security position is the responsibility of the Federal agency that requested your investigation and the agency that conducted your investigation. You will be provided the opportunity to explain, refute, or clarify any information before a final decision is made, if an unfavorable decision is considered. The United States Government does not discriminate on the basis of prohibited categories, including but not limited to race, color, religion, sex (including pregnancy and gender identity), national origin, disability, or sexual orientation when granting access to classified information.
Penalties for Inaccurate or False Statements
The U.S. Criminal Code (title 18, section 1001) provides that knowingly falsifying or concealing a material fact is a felony which may result in fines and/or up to five (5) years imprisonment. In addition, Federal agencies generally fire, do not grant a security clearance, or disqualify individuals who have materially and deliberately falsified these forms, and this remains a part of the permanent record for future placements. Your prospects of placement or security clearance are better if you answer all questions truthfully and completely. You will have adequate opportunity to explain any information you provide on this form and to make your comments part of the record.
Disclosure Information
The information you provide is for the purpose of investigating you for a national security position, and the information will be protected from unauthorized disclosure. The collection, maintenance, and disclosure of background investigative information are governed by the Privacy Act. The agency that requested the investigation and the agency that conducted the investigation have published notices in the Federal Register describing the systems of records in which your records will be maintained. The information you provide on this form, and information collected during an investigation, may be disclosed without your consent by an agency maintaining the information in a system of records as permitted by the Privacy Act [5 U.S.C. 552a(b)], and by routine uses, a list of which are published by the agency in the Federal Register. The office that gave you this form will provide you a copy of its routine uses.
You will not receive prior notice of such disclosures under a routine use.
In addition to those disclosures generally permitted under the Privacy Act, all or a portion of the records or information you provide on this form or during your investigation may be disclosed outside of OPM as a routine use as outlined below.
Office of Personnel Management (OPM) Routine Uses
OPM has published the following Privacy Act routine uses for its system of records for background investigations:
a. To designated officers and employees of agencies, offices, and other establishments in the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the Federal Government or the Government of the District of Columbia having a need to investigate, evaluate, or make a determination regarding loyalty to the United States; qualifications, suitability, or fitness for Government employment or military service; eligibility for logical or physical access to federally-controlled facilities or information systems; eligibility for access to classified information or to hold a sensitive position; qualifications or fitness to perform work for or on behalf of the Government under contract, grant, or other agreement; or access to restricted areas.
b. To an element of the U.S. Intelligence Community as identified in E.O. 12333, as amended, for use in intelligence activities for the purpose of protecting United States national security interests.
c. To any source from which information is requested in the course of an investigation, to the extent necessary to identify the individual, inform the source of the nature and purpose of the investigation, and to identify the type of information requested.
d. To the appropriate Federal, state, local, tribal, foreign, or other public authority responsible for investigating, prosecuting, enforcing, or implementing a statute, rule, regulation, or order where OPM becomes aware of an indication of a violation or potential violation of civil or criminal law or regulation.
e. To an agency, office, or other establishment in the executive, legislative, or judicial branches of the Federal Government in response to its request, in connection with its current employee's, contractor employee's, or military member's retention; loyalty; qualifications, suitability, or fitness for employment; eligibility for logical
or physical access to federally-controlled facilities or information systems; eligibility for access to classified information or to hold a sensitive position; qualifications or fitness to perform work for or on behalf of the Government under contract, grant, or other agreement; or access to restricted areas.
f. To provide information to a congressional office from the record of an individual in response to an inquiry from the congressional office made at the request of that individual. However, the investigative file, or parts thereof, will only be released to a congressional office if OPM receives a notarized authorization or signed statement under 28 U.S.C. 1746 from the subject of the investigation.
g. To disclose information to contractors, grantees, or volunteers performing or working on a contract, service, grant, cooperative agreement, or job for the Federal Government.
h. For agencies that use adjudicative support services of another agency, at the request of the original agency, the results will be furnished to the agency providing the adjudicative support.
i. To provide criminal history record information to the FBI, to help ensure the accuracy and completeness of FBI and OPM records.
j. To appropriate agencies, entities, and persons when (1) OPM suspects or has confirmed that there has been a breach of the system of records; (2) OPM has determined that as a result of the suspected or confirmed breach there is a risk of harm to individuals, the agency (including its information systems, programs and operations), the Federal Government, or national security; and (3) the disclosure made to such agencies, entities, and persons is reasonably necessary to assist in connection with OPM's efforts to respond to the suspected or confirmed breach or to prevent, minimize, or remedy such harm.
k. To another Federal agency or Federal entity, when OPM determines that information from this system of records is reasonably necessary to assist the recipient agency or entity in (1) responding to a suspected or confirmed breach or (2) preventing, minimizing, or remedying the risk of harm to individuals, the agency (including its information systems, programs and operations), the Federal Government, or national security, resulting from a suspected or confirmed breach.
l. To disclose information to another Federal agency, to a court, or a party in litigation before a court or in an administrative proceeding being conducted by a Federal agency, when the Government is a party to the judicial or administrative proceeding. In those cases where the Government is not a party to the proceeding, records may be disclosed if a subpoena has been signed by a judge.
m. To disclose information to the National Archives and Records Administration for use in records management inspections.
n. To disclose information to the Department of Justice, or in a proceeding before a court, adjudicative body, or other administrative body before which OPM is authorized to appear, when:
(1) OPM, or any component thereof; or
(2) Any employee of OPM in his or her official capacity; or
(3) Any employee of OPM in his or her individual capacity where the Department of Justice or OPM has agreed to represent the employee; or
(4) The United States, when OPM determines that litigation is likely to affect OPM or any of its components; is a party to litigation or has an interest in such litigation, and the use of such records by the Department of Justice or OPM is deemed by OPM to be relevant and necessary to the litigation, provided, however, that the disclosure is compatible with the purpose for which records were collected.
o. For the Merit Systems Protection Board--To disclose information to officials of the Merit Systems Protection Board or the Office of the Special Counsel, when requested in connection with appeals, special studies of the civil service and other merit systems, review of OPM rules and regulations, investigations of alleged or possible prohibited personnel practices, and such other functions, e.g., as promulgated in 5 U.S.C. 1205 and 1206, or as may be authorized by law.
p. To disclose information to an agency Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) office or to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission when requested in connection with investigations into alleged or possible discrimination practices in the Federal sector, or in the processing of a Federal-sector EEO complaint.
q. To disclose information to the Federal Labor Relations Authority or its General Counsel when requested in connection with investigations of allegations of unfair labor practices or matters before the Federal Service Impasses Panel.
r. To another Federal agency's Office of Inspector General when OPM becomes aware of an indication of misconduct or fraud during the applicant's submission of the standard forms.
s. To another Federal agency's Office of Inspector General in connection with its inspection or audit activity of the investigative or adjudicative processes and procedures of its agency as authorized by the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, exclusive of requests for civil or criminal law enforcement activities.
t. To a Federal agency or state unemployment compensation office upon its request in order to adjudicate a claim for unemployment compensation benefits when the claim for benefits is made as the result of a qualifications, suitability, fitness, security, identity credential, or access determination.
u. To appropriately cleared individuals in Federal agencies, to determine whether information obtained in the course of processing the background investigation is or should be classified.
v. To the Office of the Director of National Intelligence for inclusion in its Scattered Castles system in order to facilitate reciprocity of background investigations and security clearances within the intelligence community or assist agencies in obtaining information required by the Federal Investigative Standards.
w. To the Director of National Intelligence, or assignee, such information as may be requested and relevant to implement the responsibilities of the Security Executive Agent for personnel security, and pertinent personnel security research and oversight, consistent with law or executive order.
x. To Executive Branch Agency insider threat, counterintelligence, and counterterrorism officials to fulfill their responsibilities under applicable Federal law and policy, including but not limited to E.O. 12333, 13587 and the National Insider Threat Policy and Minimum Standards.
y. To the appropriate Federal, State, local, tribal, foreign, or other public authority in the event of a natural or manmade disaster. The record will be used to provide leads to assist in locating missing subjects or assist in determining the health and safety of the subject. The record will also be used to assist in identifying victims and locating any surviving next of kin.
z. To Federal, State, and local government agencies, if necessary, to obtain information from them which will assist OPM in its responsibilities as the authorized Investigation Service Provider in conducting studies and analyses in support of evaluating and improving the effectiveness and efficiency of the background investigation methodologies.
aa. To an agency, office, or other establishment in the executive, legislative, or judicial branches of the Federal Government in response to its request, in connection with the classifying of jobs, the letting of a contract, or the issuance of a license, grant, or other benefit by the requesting agency, to the extent that the information is relevant and necessary to the requesting agency's decision on the matter.
Final determination on your eligibility for a national security position is the responsibility of the Federal agency that requested your investigation and the agency that conducted your investigation. You will be provided the opportunity to explain, refute, or clarify any information before a final decision is made, if an unfavorable decision is considered. The United States Government does not discriminate on the basis of prohibited categories, including but not limited to race, color, religion, sex (including pregnancy and gender identity), national origin, disability, or sexual orientation when granting access to classified information.
Penalties for Inaccurate or False Statements
The U.S. Criminal Code (title 18, section 1001) provides that knowingly falsifying or concealing a material fact is a felony which may result in fines and/or up to five (5) years imprisonment. In addition, Federal agencies generally fire, do not grant a security clearance, or disqualify individuals who have materially and deliberately falsified these forms, and this remains a part of the permanent record for future placements. Your prospects of placement or security clearance are better if you answer all questions truthfully and completely. You will have adequate opportunity to explain any information you provide on this form and to make your comments part of the record.
Disclosure Information
The information you provide is for the purpose of investigating you for a national security position, and the information will be protected from unauthorized disclosure. The collection, maintenance, and disclosure of background investigative information are governed by the Privacy Act. The agency that requested the investigation and the agency that conducted the investigation have published notices in the Federal Register describing the systems of records in which your records will be maintained. The information you provide on this form, and information collected during an investigation, may be disclosed without your consent by an agency maintaining the information in a system of records as permitted by the Privacy Act [5 U.S.C. 552a(b)], and by routine uses, a list of which are published by the agency in the Federal Register. The office that gave you this form will provide you a copy of its routine uses.
You will not receive prior notice of such disclosures under a routine use.
In addition to those disclosures generally permitted under the Privacy Act, all or a portion of the records or information you provide on this form or during your investigation may be disclosed outside of OPM as a routine use as outlined below.
Office of Personnel Management (OPM) Routine Uses
OPM has published the following Privacy Act routine uses for its system of records for background investigations:
a. To designated officers and employees of agencies, offices, and other establishments in the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the Federal Government or the Government of the District of Columbia having a need to investigate, evaluate, or make a determination regarding loyalty to the United States; qualifications, suitability, or fitness for Government employment or military service; eligibility for logical or physical access to federally-controlled facilities or information systems; eligibility for access to classified information or to hold a sensitive position; qualifications or fitness to perform work for or on behalf of the Government under contract, grant, or other agreement; or access to restricted areas.
b. To an element of the U.S. Intelligence Community as identified in E.O. 12333, as amended, for use in intelligence activities for the purpose of protecting United States national security interests.
c. To any source from which information is requested in the course of an investigation, to the extent necessary to identify the individual, inform the source of the nature and purpose of the investigation, and to identify the type of information requested.
d. To the appropriate Federal, state, local, tribal, foreign, or other public authority responsible for investigating, prosecuting, enforcing, or implementing a statute, rule, regulation, or order where OPM becomes aware of an indication of a violation or potential violation of civil or criminal law or regulation.
e. To an agency, office, or other establishment in the executive, legislative, or judicial branches of the Federal Government in response to its request, in connection with its current employee's, contractor employee's, or military member's retention; loyalty; qualifications, suitability, or fitness for employment; eligibility for logical
or physical access to federally-controlled facilities or information systems; eligibility for access to classified information or to hold a sensitive position; qualifications or fitness to perform work for or on behalf of the Government under contract, grant, or other agreement; or access to restricted areas.
f. To provide information to a congressional office from the record of an individual in response to an inquiry from the congressional office made at the request of that individual. However, the investigative file, or parts thereof, will only be released to a congressional office if OPM receives a notarized authorization or signed statement under 28 U.S.C. 1746 from the subject of the investigation.
g. To disclose information to contractors, grantees, or volunteers performing or working on a contract, service, grant, cooperative agreement, or job for the Federal Government.
h. For agencies that use adjudicative support services of another agency, at the request of the original agency, the results will be furnished to the agency providing the adjudicative support.
i. To provide criminal history record information to the FBI, to help ensure the accuracy and completeness of FBI and OPM records.
j. To appropriate agencies, entities, and persons when (1) OPM suspects or has confirmed that there has been a breach of the system of records; (2) OPM has determined that as a result of the suspected or confirmed breach there is a risk of harm to individuals, the agency (including its information systems, programs and operations), the Federal Government, or national security; and (3) the disclosure made to such agencies, entities, and persons is reasonably necessary to assist in connection with OPM's efforts to respond to the suspected or confirmed breach or to prevent, minimize, or remedy such harm.
k. To another Federal agency or Federal entity, when OPM determines that information from this system of records is reasonably necessary to assist the recipient agency or entity in (1) responding to a suspected or confirmed breach or (2) preventing, minimizing, or remedying the risk of harm to individuals, the agency (including its information systems, programs and operations), the Federal Government, or national security, resulting from a suspected or confirmed breach.
l. To disclose information to another Federal agency, to a court, or a party in litigation before a court or in an administrative proceeding being conducted by a Federal agency, when the Government is a party to the judicial or administrative proceeding. In those cases where the Government is not a party to the proceeding, records may be disclosed if a subpoena has been signed by a judge.
m. To disclose information to the National Archives and Records Administration for use in records management inspections.
n. To disclose information to the Department of Justice, or in a proceeding before a court, adjudicative body, or other administrative body before which OPM is authorized to appear, when:
(1) OPM, or any component thereof; or
(2) Any employee of OPM in his or her official capacity; or
(3) Any employee of OPM in his or her individual capacity where the Department of Justice or OPM has agreed to represent the employee; or
(4) The United States, when OPM determines that litigation is likely to affect OPM or any of its components; is a party to litigation or has an interest in such litigation, and the use of such records by the Department of Justice or OPM is deemed by OPM to be relevant and necessary to the litigation, provided, however, that the disclosure is compatible with the purpose for which records were collected.
o. For the Merit Systems Protection Board--To disclose information to officials of the Merit Systems Protection Board or the Office of the Special Counsel, when requested in connection with appeals, special studies of the civil service and other merit systems, review of OPM rules and regulations, investigations of alleged or possible prohibited personnel practices, and such other functions, e.g., as promulgated in 5 U.S.C. 1205 and 1206, or as may be authorized by law.
p. To disclose information to an agency Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) office or to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission when requested in connection with investigations into alleged or possible discrimination practices in the Federal sector, or in the processing of a Federal-sector EEO complaint.
q. To disclose information to the Federal Labor Relations Authority or its General Counsel when requested in connection with investigations of allegations of unfair labor practices or matters before the Federal Service Impasses Panel.
r. To another Federal agency's Office of Inspector General when OPM becomes aware of an indication of misconduct or fraud during the applicant's submission of the standard forms.
s. To another Federal agency's Office of Inspector General in connection with its inspection or audit activity of the investigative or adjudicative processes and procedures of its agency as authorized by the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, exclusive of requests for civil or criminal law enforcement activities.
t. To a Federal agency or state unemployment compensation office upon its request in order to adjudicate a claim for unemployment compensation benefits when the claim for benefits is made as the result of a qualifications, suitability, fitness, security, identity credential, or access determination.
u. To appropriately cleared individuals in Federal agencies, to determine whether information obtained in the course of processing the background investigation is or should be classified.
v. To the Office of the Director of National Intelligence for inclusion in its Scattered Castles system in order to facilitate reciprocity of background investigations and security clearances within the intelligence community or assist agencies in obtaining information required by the Federal Investigative Standards.
w. To the Director of National Intelligence, or assignee, such information as may be requested and relevant to implement the responsibilities of the Security Executive Agent for personnel security, and pertinent personnel security research and oversight, consistent with law or executive order.
x. To Executive Branch Agency insider threat, counterintelligence, and counterterrorism officials to fulfill their responsibilities under applicable Federal law and policy, including but not limited to E.O. 12333, 13587 and the National Insider Threat Policy and Minimum Standards.
y. To the appropriate Federal, State, local, tribal, foreign, or other public authority in the event of a natural or manmade disaster. The record will be used to provide leads to assist in locating missing subjects or assist in determining the health and safety of the subject. The record will also be used to assist in identifying victims and locating any surviving next of kin.
z. To Federal, State, and local government agencies, if necessary, to obtain information from them which will assist OPM in its responsibilities as the authorized Investigation Service Provider in conducting studies and analyses in support of evaluating and improving the effectiveness and efficiency of the background investigation methodologies.
aa. To an agency, office, or other establishment in the executive, legislative, or judicial branches of the Federal Government in response to its request, in connection with the classifying of jobs, the letting of a contract, or the issuance of a license, grant, or other benefit by the requesting agency, to the extent that the information is relevant and necessary to the requesting agency's decision on the matter.
Five Myths About Background Investigations (credit to http://www.911jobforums.com/showthread.php?t=51141) I find myself answering posts about BI's all over the place without overcoming some of the "shared misconceptions" that happen around here so I thought I would put some of this in one place, where I can link it or more folks might see it. Besides, I might have some misconceptions and others can add or correct.
1. Backgrounds Take Forever
No. Very rarely does a BI take more than a couple of weeks to complete (I'm being generous, in terms of real work maybe four or five days). There can be factors like workload on the investigator(s) or the rare complication for an individual, but most are assigned and completed in 30 days.
Aha, you say. "Been checking weekly and they have told me my BI is not completed and it has been 6 months". Best way I can answer that is that applicants and agencies are using the term background investigation a little differently. Applicants hear pending BI and think minions are scrambling about doing something. Agencies are more likely referring to a place in the process than activity. You are pending BI when you get to that part of the process where the BI is the next step. May go quickly, may stop and start, may not start for a long term in the sense of real work being done. Agency is trying to time completion of the BI to making a selection and offer so that it is fresh.
2. If BI's were done faster, I would be hired faster
Not exactly. Again the agency is thinking of moving applicants through (with some exceptions) a process with a view to putting say 35 to 40 in a training program. If you were done first, you might well wait for the other 34 to 39 and as noted, if done to soon, it would have to be freshened up. Sometimes there is a chance that an applicant can jump up on a start date because someone drops out at the last minute, but generally your moving through like a herd and it is last steer in before first steer goes to the next pasture.
3. If agencies shared BI's, the process would be faster and cheaper
Maybe a grain of truth in this, but only a single grain. In terms of moving you as an applicant it will not go faster, because as noted, very very few places you are going to move alone. Plus the BI is both suitability and security clearance so you would undergo the suitability pretty much anyway. Also, as noted, BI's have a shelf life. Pretty much going to get updated every 5 years or so in your career and depending on your last update, easier to just fresh you up when you start with whatever agency. Anyway all benefit here would go to the agency, not to the applicant. You're going to stay "Pending BI" until the agency is ready for you and several dozen of your best friends to move on.
4. There are a couple of minor issues that I can clear up with the BI investigator
Maybe, but mostly not. What you should count on if such things exist and you have not listed them and explained them in the paperwork you are likely to be non-selected. May well get a call, and you may explain away, but on the inside of the BI/Suitability it will go down more as "Found a record that the applicant served a one day suspension for being late. The applicant did not report this disciplinary in the documentation provided. Contacted the applicant who confirmed that it was in fact them." (and then went on with a bunch of explanations none of us care about.) Good news, if any, is I know a number of folks who "forgot" or "thought it wasn't important" and got turned down, reapplied with more full disclosure and got hired - a year or so later than they would have been. Forgetting to report evidence or exculpatory information is a really bad move for Fed LE officers, so agencies like to get it all documented and spoon fed to them. Failure to disclose what the agency sees are requested information is far more fatal to applications than whatever it was -- even if it was minor crapola to begin with.
5. The process wastes a lot of money
Absolutely wrong. The process is expensive and not entirely perfect, but it saves tons on removing persons who will not be successful before the next and much bigger expense of training. The whole process of recruiting, testing, clearing, training and probation is costly. But not compared to what it costs to carefully enforce and apply the standards. Invest thousands wisely at the beginning and you are far more likely to get a multi-million dollar asset to the US. That being each of you. Don't do it and by the time you get through disaster, loss and litigation you would arrive where a lot of folks who run this process are. Doing this right is the inexpensive way to do the right thing.
1. Backgrounds Take Forever
No. Very rarely does a BI take more than a couple of weeks to complete (I'm being generous, in terms of real work maybe four or five days). There can be factors like workload on the investigator(s) or the rare complication for an individual, but most are assigned and completed in 30 days.
Aha, you say. "Been checking weekly and they have told me my BI is not completed and it has been 6 months". Best way I can answer that is that applicants and agencies are using the term background investigation a little differently. Applicants hear pending BI and think minions are scrambling about doing something. Agencies are more likely referring to a place in the process than activity. You are pending BI when you get to that part of the process where the BI is the next step. May go quickly, may stop and start, may not start for a long term in the sense of real work being done. Agency is trying to time completion of the BI to making a selection and offer so that it is fresh.
2. If BI's were done faster, I would be hired faster
Not exactly. Again the agency is thinking of moving applicants through (with some exceptions) a process with a view to putting say 35 to 40 in a training program. If you were done first, you might well wait for the other 34 to 39 and as noted, if done to soon, it would have to be freshened up. Sometimes there is a chance that an applicant can jump up on a start date because someone drops out at the last minute, but generally your moving through like a herd and it is last steer in before first steer goes to the next pasture.
3. If agencies shared BI's, the process would be faster and cheaper
Maybe a grain of truth in this, but only a single grain. In terms of moving you as an applicant it will not go faster, because as noted, very very few places you are going to move alone. Plus the BI is both suitability and security clearance so you would undergo the suitability pretty much anyway. Also, as noted, BI's have a shelf life. Pretty much going to get updated every 5 years or so in your career and depending on your last update, easier to just fresh you up when you start with whatever agency. Anyway all benefit here would go to the agency, not to the applicant. You're going to stay "Pending BI" until the agency is ready for you and several dozen of your best friends to move on.
4. There are a couple of minor issues that I can clear up with the BI investigator
Maybe, but mostly not. What you should count on if such things exist and you have not listed them and explained them in the paperwork you are likely to be non-selected. May well get a call, and you may explain away, but on the inside of the BI/Suitability it will go down more as "Found a record that the applicant served a one day suspension for being late. The applicant did not report this disciplinary in the documentation provided. Contacted the applicant who confirmed that it was in fact them." (and then went on with a bunch of explanations none of us care about.) Good news, if any, is I know a number of folks who "forgot" or "thought it wasn't important" and got turned down, reapplied with more full disclosure and got hired - a year or so later than they would have been. Forgetting to report evidence or exculpatory information is a really bad move for Fed LE officers, so agencies like to get it all documented and spoon fed to them. Failure to disclose what the agency sees are requested information is far more fatal to applications than whatever it was -- even if it was minor crapola to begin with.
5. The process wastes a lot of money
Absolutely wrong. The process is expensive and not entirely perfect, but it saves tons on removing persons who will not be successful before the next and much bigger expense of training. The whole process of recruiting, testing, clearing, training and probation is costly. But not compared to what it costs to carefully enforce and apply the standards. Invest thousands wisely at the beginning and you are far more likely to get a multi-million dollar asset to the US. That being each of you. Don't do it and by the time you get through disaster, loss and litigation you would arrive where a lot of folks who run this process are. Doing this right is the inexpensive way to do the right thing.
Title 32 CFR Part 147
Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information
(or What Can Keep Me from Getting a Clearance? [and thus, a job])
Subpart A—Adjudication
§ 147.1 Introduction.
The following adjudicative guidelines are established for all United States Government civilian and military personnel, consultants, contractors, employees of contractors, licensees, certificate holders or grantees and their employees and other individuals who require access to classified information. They apply to persons being considered for initial or continued eligibility for access to classified information, to include sensitive compartmented information and special access programs and are to be used by government departments and agencies in all final clearance determinations.
§ 147.2 Adjudicative process.
(a) The adjudicative process is an examination of a sufficient period of a person's life to make an affirmative determination that the person is eligible for a security clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is predicated upon the individual meeting these personnel security guidelines. The adjudicative process is the careful weighing of a number of variables known as the whole person concept. Available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, should be considered in reaching a determination. In evaluating the relevance of an individual's conduct, the adjudicator should consider the following actors:
(1) The nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct;
(2) The circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable participation;
(3) The frequency and recency of the conduct;
(4) The individual's age and maturity at the time of the conduct;
(5) The voluntariness of participation;
(6) The presence or absence of rehabilitation and other pertinent behavioral changes;
(7) The motivation for the conduct;
(8) The potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress;
(9) The likelihood of continuation of recurrence.
(b) Each case must be judged on its own merits, and final determination remains the responsibility of the specific department or agency. Any doubt as to whether access to classified information is clearly consistent with national security will be resolved in favor of the national security.
(c) The ultimate determination of whether the granting or continuing of eligibility for a security clearance is clearly consistent with the interests of national security must be an overall common sense determination based upon careful consideration of the following, each of which is to be evaluated in the context of the whole person, as explained further below: (All of these are listed in the paragraphs below. Clicking on the links will take you away from the HonorFirst.com web site.)
(1) Guideline A: Allegiance to the United States
(2) Guideline B: Foreign Influence
(3) Guideline C: Foreign Preference
(4) Guideline D: Sexual Behavior
(5) Guideline E: Personal Conduct
(6) Guideline F: Financial Considerations
(7) Guideline G: Alcohol Consumption
(8) Guideline H: Drug Involvement
(9) Guideline I: Psychological Conditions
(10) Guideline J: Criminal Conduct
(11) Guideline K: Handling Protected Information
(12) Guideline L: Outside Activities
(13) Guideline M: Use of Information Technology Systems
(d) Although adverse information concerning a single criterion may not be sufficient for an unfavorable determination, the individual may be disqualified if available information reflects a recent or recurring pattern of questionable judgment, irresponsibility, or emotionally unstable behavior. Notwithstanding the whole-person concept, pursuit of further investigation may be terminated by an appropriate adjudicative agency in the face of reliable, significant, disqualifying, adverse information.
(e) When information of security concern becomes known about an individual who is currently eligible for access to classified information, the adjudicator should consider whether the person:
(1) voluntarily reported the information;
(2) was truthful and complete in responding to questions;
(3) sought assistance and followed professional guidance, where appropriate;
(4) resolved or appears likely to favorably resolve the security concern;
(5) has demonstrated positive changes in behavior and employment;
(6) should have his or her access temporarily suspended pending final adjudication of the information.
(f) If after evaluating information of security concern, the adjudicator decides that the information is not serious enough to warrant a recommendation of disapproval or revocation of the security clearance, it may be appropriate to recommend approval with a warning that future incidents of a similar nature may result in revocation of access.
§ 147.3 Guideline A—Allegiance to the United States.
(a) The concern. An individual must be of unquestioned allegiance to the United States. The willingness to safeguard classified information is in doubt if there is any reason to suspect an individual's allegiance to the Untied States.
(b) Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include:
(1) Involvement in any act of sabotage, espionage, treason, terrorism, sedition, or other act whose aim is to overthrow the Government of the United States or alter the form of government by unconstitutional means;
(2) Association or sympathy with persons who are attempting to commit, or who are committing, any of the above acts;
(3) Association or sympathy with persons or organizations that advocate the overthrow of the United States Government, or any state or subdivision, by force or violence or by other unconstitutional means;
(4) Involvement in activities which unlawfully advocate or practice the commission of acts of force or violence to prevent others from exercising their rights under the Constitution or laws of the United States or of any state.
(c) Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:
(1) The individual was unaware of the unlawful aims of the individual or organization and severed ties upon learning of these;
(2) The individual's involvement was only with the lawful or humanitarian aspects of such an organization;
(3) Involvement in the above activities occurred for only a short period of time and was attributable to curiosity or academic interest;
(4) The person has had no recent involvement or association with such activities.
§ 147.4 Guideline B—Foreign influence.
(a) The concern. A security risk may exist when an individual's immediate family, including cohabitants and other persons to whom he or she may be bound by affection, influence, or obligation are not citizens of the Untied States or may be subject to duress. These situations could create the potential for foreign influence that could result in the compromise of classified information. Contacts with citizens of other countries or financial interests in other countries are also relevant to security determinations if they make an individual potentially vulnerable to coercion, exploitation, or pressure.
(b) Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include:
(1) An immediate family member, or a person to whom the individual has close ties of affection or obligation, is a citizen of, or resident or present in, a foreign country;
(2) Sharing living quarters with a person or persons, regardless of their citizenship status, if the potential for adverse foreign influence or duress exists;
(3) Relatives, cohabitants, or associates who are connected with any foreign government;
(4) Failing to report, where required, associations with foreign nationals;
(5) Unauthorized association with a suspected or known collaborator or employee of a foreign intelligence service;
(6) Conduct which may make the individual vulnerable to coercion, exploitation, or pressure by a foreign government;
(7) Indications that representatives or nationals from a foreign country are acting to increase the vulnerability of the individual to possible future exploitation, coercion or pressure;
(8) A substantial financial interest in a country, or in any foreign owned or operated business that could make the individual vulnerable to foreign influence.
(c) Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:
(1) A determination that the immediate family member(s) (spouse, father, mother, sons, daughters, brothers, sisters), cohabitant, or associate(s) in question are not agents of a foreign power or in a position to be exploited by a foreign power in a way that could force the individual to choose between loyalty to the person(s) involved and the United States;
(2) Contacts with foreign citizens are the result of official United States Government business;
(3) Contact and correspondence with foreign citizens are casual and infrequent;
(4) The individual has promptly complied with existing agency requirements regarding the reporting of contacts, requests, or threats from persons or organizations from a foreign country;
(5) Foreign financial interests are minimal and not sufficient to affect the individual's security responsibilities.
§ 147.5 Guideline C—Foreign preference.
(a) The concern. When an individual acts in such a way as to indicate a preference for a foreign country over the United States, then he or she may be prone to provide information or make decisions that are harmful to the interests of the United States.
(b) Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include:
(1) The exercise of dual citizenship;
(2) Possession and/or use of a foreign passport;
(3) Military service or a willingness to bear arms for a foreign country;
(4) Accepting educational, medical, or other benefits, such as retirement and social welfare, from a foreign country;
(5) Residence in a foreign country to meet citizenship requirements;
(6) Using foreign citizenship to protect financial or business interests in another country;
(7) Seeking or holding political office in the foreign country;
(8) Voting in foreign elections;
(9) Performing or attempting to perform duties, or otherwise acting, so as to serve the interests of another government in preference to the interests of the United States.
(c) Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:
(1) Dual citizenship is based solely on parents' citizenship or birth in a foreign country;
(2) Indicators of possible foreign preference (e.g., foreign military service) occurred before obtaining United States citizenship;
(3) Activity is sanctioned by the United States;
(4) Individual has expressed a willingness to renounce dual citizenship.
§ 147.6 Guidance D—Sexual behavior.
(a) The concern. Sexual behavior is a security concern if it involves a criminal offense, indicates a personality or emotional disorder, may subject the individual to coercion, exploitation, or duress, or reflects lack of judgment or discretion. Sexual orientation or preference may not be used as a basis for or a disqualifying factor in determining a person's eligibility for a security clearance.
(b) Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include:
(1) Sexual behavior of a criminal nature, whether or not the individual has been prosecuted;
(2) Compulsive or addictive sexual behavior when the person is unable to stop a pattern or self-destructive or high-risk behavior or that which is symptomatic of a personally disorder;
(3) Sexual behavior that causes an individual to be vulnerable to coercion, exploitation, or duress;
(4) Sexual behavior of a public nature and/or that which reflects lack of discretion or judgment.
(c) Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:
(1) The behavior occurred during or prior to adolescence and there is no evidence of subsequent conduct of a similar nature;
(2) The behavior was not recent and there is no evidence of subsequent conduct of a similar nature;
(3) There is no other evidence of questionable judgment, irresponsibility, or emotional instability;
(4) The behavior no longer serves as a basis for coercion, exploitation, or duress.
§ 147.7 Guideline E—Personal conduct.
(a) The concern. Conduct involving questionable judgment, untrustworthiness, unreliability, lack of candor, dishonesty, or unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations could indicate that the person may not properly safeguard classified information. The following will normally result in an unfavorable clearance action or administrative termination of further processing for clearance eligibility:
(1) Refusal to undergo or cooperate with required security processing, including medical and psychological testing;
(2) Refusal to complete required security forms, releases, or provide full, frank and truthful answers to lawful questions of investigators, security officials or other representatives in connection with a personnel security or trustworthiness determination.
(b) Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying also include:
(1) Reliable, unfavorable information provided by associates, employers, coworkers, neighbors, and other acquaintances;
(2) The deliberate omission, concealment, or falsification of relevant and material facts from any personnel security questionnaire, personal history statement, or similar form used to conduct investigations, determine employment qualifications, award benefits or status, determine security clearance eligibility or trustworthiness, or award fiduciary responsibilities;
(3) Deliberately providing false or misleading information concerning relevant and material matters to an investigator, security official, competent medical authority, or other representative in connection with a personnel security or trustworthiness determination;
(4) Personal conduct or concealment of information that may increase an individual's vulnerability to coercion, exploitation, or duties, such as engaging in activities which, if known, may affect the person's personal, professional, or community standing or render the person susceptible to blackmail;
(5) A pattern of dishonesty or rule violations, including violation of any written or recorded agreement made between the individual and the agency;
(6) Association with persons involved in criminal activity.
(c) Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:
(1) The information was unsubstantiated or not pertinent to a determination of judgment, trustworthiness, or reliability;
(2) The falsification was an isolated incident, was not recent, and the individual has subsequently provided correct information voluntarily;
(3) The individual made prompt, good faith efforts to correct the falsification before being confronted with the facts;
(4) Omission of material facts was caused or significantly contributed to by improper or inadequate advice of authorized personnel, and the previously omitted information was promptly and fully provided;
(5) The individual has taken positive steps to significantly reduce or eliminate vulnerability to coercion, exploitation, or duress;
(6) A refusal to cooperate was based on advice from legal counsel or other officials that the individual was not required to comply with security processing requirements and, upon being made aware of the requirement, fully and truthfully provided the requested information;
(7) Association with persons involved in criminal activities has ceased.
§ 147.8 Guideline F—Financial considerations.
(a) The concern. An individual who is financially overextended is at risk of having to engage in illegal acts to generate funds. Unexplained affluence is often linked to proceeds from financially profitable criminal acts.
(b) Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include:
(1) A history of not meeting financial obligations;
(2) Deceptive or illegal financial practices such as embezzlement, employee theft, check fraud, income tax evasion, expense account fraud, filing deceptive loan statements, and other intentional financial breaches of trust;
(3) Inability or unwillingness to satisfy debts;
(4) Unexplained affluence;
(5) Financial problems that are linked to gambling, drug abuse, alcoholism, or other issues of security concern.
(c) Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:
(1) The behavior was not recent;
(2) It was an isolated incident;
(3) The conditions that resulted in the behavior were largely beyond the person's control (e.g., loss of employment, a business downtrun, unexpected medical emergency, or a death, divorce or separation);
(4) The person has received or is receiving counseling for the problem and there are clear indications that the problem is being resolved or is under control;
(5) The affluence resulted from a legal source;
(6) The individual initiated a good-faith effort to repay overdue creditors or otherwise resolve debts.
§ 147.9 Guideline G—Alcohol consumption.
(a) The concern. Excessive alcohol consumption often leads to the exercise of questionable judgment, unreliability, failure to control impulses, and increases the risk of unauthorized disclosure of classified information due to carelessness.
(b) Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include:
(1) Alcohol-related incidents away from work, such as driving while under the influence, fighting, child or spouse abuse, or other criminal incidents related to alcohol use;
(2) Alcohol-related incidents at work, such as reporting for work or duty in an intoxicated or impaired condition, or drinking on the job;
(3) Diagnosis by a credentialed medical professional (e.g., physician, clinical psychologist, or psychiatrist) of alcohol abuse or alcohol dependence;
(4) Evaluation of alcohol abuse or alcohol dependence by a licensed clinical social worker who is a staff member of a recognized alcohol treatment program;
(5) Habitual or binge consumption of alcohol to the point of impaired judgment;
(6) Consumption of alcohol, subsequent to a diagnosis of alcoholism by a credentialed medical professional and following completion of an alcohol rehabilitation program.
(c) Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:
(1) The alcohol related incidents do not indicate a pattern;
(2) The problem occurred a number of years ago and there is no indication of a recent problem;
(3) Positive changes in behavior supportive of sobriety;
(4) Following diagnosis of alcohol abuse or alcohol dependence, the individual has successfully completed impatient or outpatient rehabilitation along with aftercare requirements, participates frequently in meetings of Alcoholics Anonymous or a similar organization, has abstained from alcohol for a period of at least 12 months, and received a favorable prognosis by a credentialed medical professional or a licensed clinical social worker who is a staff member of a recognized alcohol treatment program.
§ 147.10 Guideline H—Drug involvement.
(a) The concern.
(1) Improper or illegal involvement with drugs raises questions regarding an individual's willingness or ability to protect classified information. Drug abuse or dependence may impair social or occupational functioning, increasing the risk of an unauthorized disclosure of classified information.
(2) Drugs are defined as mood and behavior altering substances, and include:
(i) Drugs, materials, and other chemical compounds identified and listed in the Controlled Substances Act of 1970, as amended (e.g., marijuana or cannabis, depressants, narcotics, stimulants, and hallucinogens),
(ii) Inhalants and other similar substances.
(3) Drug abuse is the illegal use of a drug or use of a legal drug in a manner that deviates from approved medical direction.
(b) Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include:
(1) Any drug abuse (see above definition);
(2) Illegal drug possession, including cultivation, processing, manufacture, purchase, sale, or distribution;
(3) Diagnosis by a credentialed medical professional (e.g., physician, clinical psychologist, or psychiatrist) of drug abuse or drug dependence;
(4) Evaluation of drug abuse or drug dependence by a licensed clinical social worker who is a staff member of a recognized drug treatment program;
(5) Failure to successfully complete a drug treatment program prescribed by a credentialed medical professional. Recent drug involvement, especially following the granting of a security clearance, or an expressed intent not to discontinue use, will almost invariably result in an unfavorable determination.
(c) Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:
(1) The drug involvement was not recent;
(2) The drug involvement was an isolated or aberration event;
(3) A demonstrated intent not to abuse any drugs in the future;
(4) Satisfactory completion of a prescribed drug treatment program, including rehabilitation and aftercare requirements, without recurrence of abuse, and a favorable prognosis by a credentialed medical professional.
§ 147.11 Guideline I—Emotional, mental, and personality disorders.
(a) The concern: Emotional, mental, and personality disorders can cause a significant deficit in an individual's psychological, social and occupation functioning. These disorders are of security concern because they may indicate a defect in judgment, reliability, or stability. A credentialed mental health professional (e.g., clinical psychologist or psychiatrist), employed by, acceptable to or approved by the government, should be utilized in evaluating potentially disqualifying and mitigating information fully and properly, and particularly for consultation with the individual's mental health care provider.
(b) Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include:
(1) An opinion by a credentialed mental health professional that the individual has a condition or treatment that may indicate a defect in judgment, reliability, or stability;
(2) Information that suggests that an individual has failed to follow appropriate medical advice relating to treatment of a condition, e.g., failure to take prescribed medication;
(3) A pattern of high-risk, irresponsible, aggressive, anti-social or emotionally unstable behavior;
(4) Information that suggests that the individual's current behavior indicates a defect in his or her judgment or reliability.
(c) Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:
(1) There is no indication of a current problem;
(2) Recent opinion by a credentialed mental health professional that an individual's previous emotional, mental, or personality disorder is cured, under control or in remission and has a low probability of recurrence or exacerbation;
(3) The past emotional instability was a temporary condition (e.g., one caused by a death, illness, or marital breakup), the situation has been resolved, and the individual is no longer emotionally unstable.
§ 147.12 Guideline J—Criminal conduct.
(a) The concern. A history or pattern of criminal activity creates doubt about a person's judgment, reliability and trustworthiness.
(b) Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include:
(1) Allegations or admissions of criminal conduct, regardless of whether the person was formally charged;
(2) A single serious crime or multiple lesser offenses.
(c) Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:
(1) The criminal behavior was not recent;
(2) The crime was an isolated incident;
(3) The person was pressured or coerced into committing the act and those pressures are no longer present in that person's life;
(4) The person did not voluntarily commit the act and/or the factors leading to the violation are not likely to recur;
(5) Acquittal;
(6) There is clear evidence of successful rehabilitation.
§ 147.13 Guideline K—Security violations.
(a) The concern. Noncompliance with security regulations raises doubt about an individual's trustworthiness, willingness, and ability to safeguard classified information.
(b) Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include.
(1) Unauthorized disclosure of classified information;
(2) Violations that are deliberate or multiple or due to negligence.
(c) Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include actions that:
(1) Were inadvertent;
(2) Were isolated or infrequent;
(3) Were due to improper or inadequate training;
(4) Demonstrate a positive attitude towards the discharge of security responsibilities.
§ 147.14 Guideline L—Outside activities.
(a) The concern. Involvement in certain types of outside employment or activities is of security concern if it poses a conflict with an individual's security responsibilities and could create an increased risk of unauthorized disclosure of classified information.
(b) Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include any service, whether compensated, volunteer, or employment with:
(1) A foreign country;
(2) Any foreign national;
(3) A representative of any foreign interest;
(4) Any foreign, domestic, or international organization or person engaged in analysis, discussion, or publication of material on intelligence, defense, foreign affairs, or protected technology.
(c) Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:
(1) Evaluation of the outside employment or activity indicates that it does not pose a conflict with an individual's security responsibilities;
(2) The individual terminates the employment or discontinues the activity upon being notified that it is in conflict with his or her security responsibilities.
§ 147.15 Guideline M—Misuse of Information technology systems.
(a) The concern. Noncompliance with rules, procedures, guidelines, or regulations pertaining to information technology systems may raise security concerns about an individual's trustworthiness, willingness, and ability to properly protect classified systems, networks, and information. Information Technology Systems include all related equipment used for the communication, transmission, processing, manipulation, and storage of classified or sensitive information.
(b) Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include:
(1) Illegal or unauthorized entry into any information technology system;
(2) Illegal or unauthorized modification, destruction, manipulation or denial of access to information residing on an information technology system;
(3) Removal (or use) of hardware, software, or media from any information technology system without authorization, when specifically prohibited by rules, procedures, guidelines or regulations;
(4) Introduction of hardware, software, or media into any information technology system without authorization, when specifically prohibited by rules, procedures, guidelines or regulations.
(c) Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:
(1) The misuse was not recent or significant;
(2) The conduct was unintentional or inadvertent;
(3) The introduction or removal of media was authorized;
(4) The misuse was an isolated event;
(5) The misuse was followed by a prompt, good faith effort to correct the situation.
Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information
(or What Can Keep Me from Getting a Clearance? [and thus, a job])
Subpart A—Adjudication
§ 147.1 Introduction.
The following adjudicative guidelines are established for all United States Government civilian and military personnel, consultants, contractors, employees of contractors, licensees, certificate holders or grantees and their employees and other individuals who require access to classified information. They apply to persons being considered for initial or continued eligibility for access to classified information, to include sensitive compartmented information and special access programs and are to be used by government departments and agencies in all final clearance determinations.
§ 147.2 Adjudicative process.
(a) The adjudicative process is an examination of a sufficient period of a person's life to make an affirmative determination that the person is eligible for a security clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is predicated upon the individual meeting these personnel security guidelines. The adjudicative process is the careful weighing of a number of variables known as the whole person concept. Available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, should be considered in reaching a determination. In evaluating the relevance of an individual's conduct, the adjudicator should consider the following actors:
(1) The nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct;
(2) The circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable participation;
(3) The frequency and recency of the conduct;
(4) The individual's age and maturity at the time of the conduct;
(5) The voluntariness of participation;
(6) The presence or absence of rehabilitation and other pertinent behavioral changes;
(7) The motivation for the conduct;
(8) The potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress;
(9) The likelihood of continuation of recurrence.
(b) Each case must be judged on its own merits, and final determination remains the responsibility of the specific department or agency. Any doubt as to whether access to classified information is clearly consistent with national security will be resolved in favor of the national security.
(c) The ultimate determination of whether the granting or continuing of eligibility for a security clearance is clearly consistent with the interests of national security must be an overall common sense determination based upon careful consideration of the following, each of which is to be evaluated in the context of the whole person, as explained further below: (All of these are listed in the paragraphs below. Clicking on the links will take you away from the HonorFirst.com web site.)
(1) Guideline A: Allegiance to the United States
(2) Guideline B: Foreign Influence
(3) Guideline C: Foreign Preference
(4) Guideline D: Sexual Behavior
(5) Guideline E: Personal Conduct
(6) Guideline F: Financial Considerations
(7) Guideline G: Alcohol Consumption
(8) Guideline H: Drug Involvement
(9) Guideline I: Psychological Conditions
(10) Guideline J: Criminal Conduct
(11) Guideline K: Handling Protected Information
(12) Guideline L: Outside Activities
(13) Guideline M: Use of Information Technology Systems
(d) Although adverse information concerning a single criterion may not be sufficient for an unfavorable determination, the individual may be disqualified if available information reflects a recent or recurring pattern of questionable judgment, irresponsibility, or emotionally unstable behavior. Notwithstanding the whole-person concept, pursuit of further investigation may be terminated by an appropriate adjudicative agency in the face of reliable, significant, disqualifying, adverse information.
(e) When information of security concern becomes known about an individual who is currently eligible for access to classified information, the adjudicator should consider whether the person:
(1) voluntarily reported the information;
(2) was truthful and complete in responding to questions;
(3) sought assistance and followed professional guidance, where appropriate;
(4) resolved or appears likely to favorably resolve the security concern;
(5) has demonstrated positive changes in behavior and employment;
(6) should have his or her access temporarily suspended pending final adjudication of the information.
(f) If after evaluating information of security concern, the adjudicator decides that the information is not serious enough to warrant a recommendation of disapproval or revocation of the security clearance, it may be appropriate to recommend approval with a warning that future incidents of a similar nature may result in revocation of access.
§ 147.3 Guideline A—Allegiance to the United States.
(a) The concern. An individual must be of unquestioned allegiance to the United States. The willingness to safeguard classified information is in doubt if there is any reason to suspect an individual's allegiance to the Untied States.
(b) Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include:
(1) Involvement in any act of sabotage, espionage, treason, terrorism, sedition, or other act whose aim is to overthrow the Government of the United States or alter the form of government by unconstitutional means;
(2) Association or sympathy with persons who are attempting to commit, or who are committing, any of the above acts;
(3) Association or sympathy with persons or organizations that advocate the overthrow of the United States Government, or any state or subdivision, by force or violence or by other unconstitutional means;
(4) Involvement in activities which unlawfully advocate or practice the commission of acts of force or violence to prevent others from exercising their rights under the Constitution or laws of the United States or of any state.
(c) Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:
(1) The individual was unaware of the unlawful aims of the individual or organization and severed ties upon learning of these;
(2) The individual's involvement was only with the lawful or humanitarian aspects of such an organization;
(3) Involvement in the above activities occurred for only a short period of time and was attributable to curiosity or academic interest;
(4) The person has had no recent involvement or association with such activities.
§ 147.4 Guideline B—Foreign influence.
(a) The concern. A security risk may exist when an individual's immediate family, including cohabitants and other persons to whom he or she may be bound by affection, influence, or obligation are not citizens of the Untied States or may be subject to duress. These situations could create the potential for foreign influence that could result in the compromise of classified information. Contacts with citizens of other countries or financial interests in other countries are also relevant to security determinations if they make an individual potentially vulnerable to coercion, exploitation, or pressure.
(b) Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include:
(1) An immediate family member, or a person to whom the individual has close ties of affection or obligation, is a citizen of, or resident or present in, a foreign country;
(2) Sharing living quarters with a person or persons, regardless of their citizenship status, if the potential for adverse foreign influence or duress exists;
(3) Relatives, cohabitants, or associates who are connected with any foreign government;
(4) Failing to report, where required, associations with foreign nationals;
(5) Unauthorized association with a suspected or known collaborator or employee of a foreign intelligence service;
(6) Conduct which may make the individual vulnerable to coercion, exploitation, or pressure by a foreign government;
(7) Indications that representatives or nationals from a foreign country are acting to increase the vulnerability of the individual to possible future exploitation, coercion or pressure;
(8) A substantial financial interest in a country, or in any foreign owned or operated business that could make the individual vulnerable to foreign influence.
(c) Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:
(1) A determination that the immediate family member(s) (spouse, father, mother, sons, daughters, brothers, sisters), cohabitant, or associate(s) in question are not agents of a foreign power or in a position to be exploited by a foreign power in a way that could force the individual to choose between loyalty to the person(s) involved and the United States;
(2) Contacts with foreign citizens are the result of official United States Government business;
(3) Contact and correspondence with foreign citizens are casual and infrequent;
(4) The individual has promptly complied with existing agency requirements regarding the reporting of contacts, requests, or threats from persons or organizations from a foreign country;
(5) Foreign financial interests are minimal and not sufficient to affect the individual's security responsibilities.
§ 147.5 Guideline C—Foreign preference.
(a) The concern. When an individual acts in such a way as to indicate a preference for a foreign country over the United States, then he or she may be prone to provide information or make decisions that are harmful to the interests of the United States.
(b) Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include:
(1) The exercise of dual citizenship;
(2) Possession and/or use of a foreign passport;
(3) Military service or a willingness to bear arms for a foreign country;
(4) Accepting educational, medical, or other benefits, such as retirement and social welfare, from a foreign country;
(5) Residence in a foreign country to meet citizenship requirements;
(6) Using foreign citizenship to protect financial or business interests in another country;
(7) Seeking or holding political office in the foreign country;
(8) Voting in foreign elections;
(9) Performing or attempting to perform duties, or otherwise acting, so as to serve the interests of another government in preference to the interests of the United States.
(c) Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:
(1) Dual citizenship is based solely on parents' citizenship or birth in a foreign country;
(2) Indicators of possible foreign preference (e.g., foreign military service) occurred before obtaining United States citizenship;
(3) Activity is sanctioned by the United States;
(4) Individual has expressed a willingness to renounce dual citizenship.
§ 147.6 Guidance D—Sexual behavior.
(a) The concern. Sexual behavior is a security concern if it involves a criminal offense, indicates a personality or emotional disorder, may subject the individual to coercion, exploitation, or duress, or reflects lack of judgment or discretion. Sexual orientation or preference may not be used as a basis for or a disqualifying factor in determining a person's eligibility for a security clearance.
(b) Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include:
(1) Sexual behavior of a criminal nature, whether or not the individual has been prosecuted;
(2) Compulsive or addictive sexual behavior when the person is unable to stop a pattern or self-destructive or high-risk behavior or that which is symptomatic of a personally disorder;
(3) Sexual behavior that causes an individual to be vulnerable to coercion, exploitation, or duress;
(4) Sexual behavior of a public nature and/or that which reflects lack of discretion or judgment.
(c) Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:
(1) The behavior occurred during or prior to adolescence and there is no evidence of subsequent conduct of a similar nature;
(2) The behavior was not recent and there is no evidence of subsequent conduct of a similar nature;
(3) There is no other evidence of questionable judgment, irresponsibility, or emotional instability;
(4) The behavior no longer serves as a basis for coercion, exploitation, or duress.
§ 147.7 Guideline E—Personal conduct.
(a) The concern. Conduct involving questionable judgment, untrustworthiness, unreliability, lack of candor, dishonesty, or unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations could indicate that the person may not properly safeguard classified information. The following will normally result in an unfavorable clearance action or administrative termination of further processing for clearance eligibility:
(1) Refusal to undergo or cooperate with required security processing, including medical and psychological testing;
(2) Refusal to complete required security forms, releases, or provide full, frank and truthful answers to lawful questions of investigators, security officials or other representatives in connection with a personnel security or trustworthiness determination.
(b) Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying also include:
(1) Reliable, unfavorable information provided by associates, employers, coworkers, neighbors, and other acquaintances;
(2) The deliberate omission, concealment, or falsification of relevant and material facts from any personnel security questionnaire, personal history statement, or similar form used to conduct investigations, determine employment qualifications, award benefits or status, determine security clearance eligibility or trustworthiness, or award fiduciary responsibilities;
(3) Deliberately providing false or misleading information concerning relevant and material matters to an investigator, security official, competent medical authority, or other representative in connection with a personnel security or trustworthiness determination;
(4) Personal conduct or concealment of information that may increase an individual's vulnerability to coercion, exploitation, or duties, such as engaging in activities which, if known, may affect the person's personal, professional, or community standing or render the person susceptible to blackmail;
(5) A pattern of dishonesty or rule violations, including violation of any written or recorded agreement made between the individual and the agency;
(6) Association with persons involved in criminal activity.
(c) Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:
(1) The information was unsubstantiated or not pertinent to a determination of judgment, trustworthiness, or reliability;
(2) The falsification was an isolated incident, was not recent, and the individual has subsequently provided correct information voluntarily;
(3) The individual made prompt, good faith efforts to correct the falsification before being confronted with the facts;
(4) Omission of material facts was caused or significantly contributed to by improper or inadequate advice of authorized personnel, and the previously omitted information was promptly and fully provided;
(5) The individual has taken positive steps to significantly reduce or eliminate vulnerability to coercion, exploitation, or duress;
(6) A refusal to cooperate was based on advice from legal counsel or other officials that the individual was not required to comply with security processing requirements and, upon being made aware of the requirement, fully and truthfully provided the requested information;
(7) Association with persons involved in criminal activities has ceased.
§ 147.8 Guideline F—Financial considerations.
(a) The concern. An individual who is financially overextended is at risk of having to engage in illegal acts to generate funds. Unexplained affluence is often linked to proceeds from financially profitable criminal acts.
(b) Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include:
(1) A history of not meeting financial obligations;
(2) Deceptive or illegal financial practices such as embezzlement, employee theft, check fraud, income tax evasion, expense account fraud, filing deceptive loan statements, and other intentional financial breaches of trust;
(3) Inability or unwillingness to satisfy debts;
(4) Unexplained affluence;
(5) Financial problems that are linked to gambling, drug abuse, alcoholism, or other issues of security concern.
(c) Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:
(1) The behavior was not recent;
(2) It was an isolated incident;
(3) The conditions that resulted in the behavior were largely beyond the person's control (e.g., loss of employment, a business downtrun, unexpected medical emergency, or a death, divorce or separation);
(4) The person has received or is receiving counseling for the problem and there are clear indications that the problem is being resolved or is under control;
(5) The affluence resulted from a legal source;
(6) The individual initiated a good-faith effort to repay overdue creditors or otherwise resolve debts.
§ 147.9 Guideline G—Alcohol consumption.
(a) The concern. Excessive alcohol consumption often leads to the exercise of questionable judgment, unreliability, failure to control impulses, and increases the risk of unauthorized disclosure of classified information due to carelessness.
(b) Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include:
(1) Alcohol-related incidents away from work, such as driving while under the influence, fighting, child or spouse abuse, or other criminal incidents related to alcohol use;
(2) Alcohol-related incidents at work, such as reporting for work or duty in an intoxicated or impaired condition, or drinking on the job;
(3) Diagnosis by a credentialed medical professional (e.g., physician, clinical psychologist, or psychiatrist) of alcohol abuse or alcohol dependence;
(4) Evaluation of alcohol abuse or alcohol dependence by a licensed clinical social worker who is a staff member of a recognized alcohol treatment program;
(5) Habitual or binge consumption of alcohol to the point of impaired judgment;
(6) Consumption of alcohol, subsequent to a diagnosis of alcoholism by a credentialed medical professional and following completion of an alcohol rehabilitation program.
(c) Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:
(1) The alcohol related incidents do not indicate a pattern;
(2) The problem occurred a number of years ago and there is no indication of a recent problem;
(3) Positive changes in behavior supportive of sobriety;
(4) Following diagnosis of alcohol abuse or alcohol dependence, the individual has successfully completed impatient or outpatient rehabilitation along with aftercare requirements, participates frequently in meetings of Alcoholics Anonymous or a similar organization, has abstained from alcohol for a period of at least 12 months, and received a favorable prognosis by a credentialed medical professional or a licensed clinical social worker who is a staff member of a recognized alcohol treatment program.
§ 147.10 Guideline H—Drug involvement.
(a) The concern.
(1) Improper or illegal involvement with drugs raises questions regarding an individual's willingness or ability to protect classified information. Drug abuse or dependence may impair social or occupational functioning, increasing the risk of an unauthorized disclosure of classified information.
(2) Drugs are defined as mood and behavior altering substances, and include:
(i) Drugs, materials, and other chemical compounds identified and listed in the Controlled Substances Act of 1970, as amended (e.g., marijuana or cannabis, depressants, narcotics, stimulants, and hallucinogens),
(ii) Inhalants and other similar substances.
(3) Drug abuse is the illegal use of a drug or use of a legal drug in a manner that deviates from approved medical direction.
(b) Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include:
(1) Any drug abuse (see above definition);
(2) Illegal drug possession, including cultivation, processing, manufacture, purchase, sale, or distribution;
(3) Diagnosis by a credentialed medical professional (e.g., physician, clinical psychologist, or psychiatrist) of drug abuse or drug dependence;
(4) Evaluation of drug abuse or drug dependence by a licensed clinical social worker who is a staff member of a recognized drug treatment program;
(5) Failure to successfully complete a drug treatment program prescribed by a credentialed medical professional. Recent drug involvement, especially following the granting of a security clearance, or an expressed intent not to discontinue use, will almost invariably result in an unfavorable determination.
(c) Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:
(1) The drug involvement was not recent;
(2) The drug involvement was an isolated or aberration event;
(3) A demonstrated intent not to abuse any drugs in the future;
(4) Satisfactory completion of a prescribed drug treatment program, including rehabilitation and aftercare requirements, without recurrence of abuse, and a favorable prognosis by a credentialed medical professional.
§ 147.11 Guideline I—Emotional, mental, and personality disorders.
(a) The concern: Emotional, mental, and personality disorders can cause a significant deficit in an individual's psychological, social and occupation functioning. These disorders are of security concern because they may indicate a defect in judgment, reliability, or stability. A credentialed mental health professional (e.g., clinical psychologist or psychiatrist), employed by, acceptable to or approved by the government, should be utilized in evaluating potentially disqualifying and mitigating information fully and properly, and particularly for consultation with the individual's mental health care provider.
(b) Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include:
(1) An opinion by a credentialed mental health professional that the individual has a condition or treatment that may indicate a defect in judgment, reliability, or stability;
(2) Information that suggests that an individual has failed to follow appropriate medical advice relating to treatment of a condition, e.g., failure to take prescribed medication;
(3) A pattern of high-risk, irresponsible, aggressive, anti-social or emotionally unstable behavior;
(4) Information that suggests that the individual's current behavior indicates a defect in his or her judgment or reliability.
(c) Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:
(1) There is no indication of a current problem;
(2) Recent opinion by a credentialed mental health professional that an individual's previous emotional, mental, or personality disorder is cured, under control or in remission and has a low probability of recurrence or exacerbation;
(3) The past emotional instability was a temporary condition (e.g., one caused by a death, illness, or marital breakup), the situation has been resolved, and the individual is no longer emotionally unstable.
§ 147.12 Guideline J—Criminal conduct.
(a) The concern. A history or pattern of criminal activity creates doubt about a person's judgment, reliability and trustworthiness.
(b) Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include:
(1) Allegations or admissions of criminal conduct, regardless of whether the person was formally charged;
(2) A single serious crime or multiple lesser offenses.
(c) Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:
(1) The criminal behavior was not recent;
(2) The crime was an isolated incident;
(3) The person was pressured or coerced into committing the act and those pressures are no longer present in that person's life;
(4) The person did not voluntarily commit the act and/or the factors leading to the violation are not likely to recur;
(5) Acquittal;
(6) There is clear evidence of successful rehabilitation.
§ 147.13 Guideline K—Security violations.
(a) The concern. Noncompliance with security regulations raises doubt about an individual's trustworthiness, willingness, and ability to safeguard classified information.
(b) Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include.
(1) Unauthorized disclosure of classified information;
(2) Violations that are deliberate or multiple or due to negligence.
(c) Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include actions that:
(1) Were inadvertent;
(2) Were isolated or infrequent;
(3) Were due to improper or inadequate training;
(4) Demonstrate a positive attitude towards the discharge of security responsibilities.
§ 147.14 Guideline L—Outside activities.
(a) The concern. Involvement in certain types of outside employment or activities is of security concern if it poses a conflict with an individual's security responsibilities and could create an increased risk of unauthorized disclosure of classified information.
(b) Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include any service, whether compensated, volunteer, or employment with:
(1) A foreign country;
(2) Any foreign national;
(3) A representative of any foreign interest;
(4) Any foreign, domestic, or international organization or person engaged in analysis, discussion, or publication of material on intelligence, defense, foreign affairs, or protected technology.
(c) Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:
(1) Evaluation of the outside employment or activity indicates that it does not pose a conflict with an individual's security responsibilities;
(2) The individual terminates the employment or discontinues the activity upon being notified that it is in conflict with his or her security responsibilities.
§ 147.15 Guideline M—Misuse of Information technology systems.
(a) The concern. Noncompliance with rules, procedures, guidelines, or regulations pertaining to information technology systems may raise security concerns about an individual's trustworthiness, willingness, and ability to properly protect classified systems, networks, and information. Information Technology Systems include all related equipment used for the communication, transmission, processing, manipulation, and storage of classified or sensitive information.
(b) Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include:
(1) Illegal or unauthorized entry into any information technology system;
(2) Illegal or unauthorized modification, destruction, manipulation or denial of access to information residing on an information technology system;
(3) Removal (or use) of hardware, software, or media from any information technology system without authorization, when specifically prohibited by rules, procedures, guidelines or regulations;
(4) Introduction of hardware, software, or media into any information technology system without authorization, when specifically prohibited by rules, procedures, guidelines or regulations.
(c) Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:
(1) The misuse was not recent or significant;
(2) The conduct was unintentional or inadvertent;
(3) The introduction or removal of media was authorized;
(4) The misuse was an isolated event;
(5) The misuse was followed by a prompt, good faith effort to correct the situation.
